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31 Introduction: Analytic Hegelianism and Pittsburgh 
hermeneutics
At the turn of the 20th century, Russell's Principles of Mathematics (2010 [1903]) and Moore's 
Principia Ethica (2004 [1903]) laid the foundation for the movement that was to grow into analytic 
philosophy. The philosophical outlooks the two Cambridge philosophers expressed in these works – 
Moore's early Platonism, Russell's realism about relations – were deeply antagonistic to the prevailing 
philosophy of their day. Russell and Moore were rebelling against what they thought to be the stifling 
dogmatism of British Idealism, which Russell (1993 [1952]) blamed for divorcing philosophy from 
common sense and assimilating it to theology. Ostensibly seeking to treat the problem at its source, 
Russell launched a wave of attacks directed against Hegel, tracing the metaphysical extravagance of 
idealism back to a reliance on Aristotelian logic, which he took Frege's innovations to have rendered 
obsolete.1 Russell's critiques have become legendary, and were taken almost universally by a generation of 
analytic philosophers to reveal such deep flaws in Hegel's thought as to warrant abandoning of the old 
German thinker in favour of newer, more fertile pastures. Even long after analytic philosophy had moved 
on from Russell, Hegel's idealism continued to be dismissed as a laughable philosophical position. As a 
result, for the better part of the twentieth century no effort was made within analytic philosophy to 
separate Hegel's idealism from its more familiar Berkeleyan counterpart, and the “idealist” tended either 
to denote a nondescript philosophical bogeyman, or else to be used as a term of mockery and derision.2
A wave of careful scholarship into the foundations of analytic philosophy, succinctly brought 
together by Redding (2007, pp.1–20), has however revealed that the figure Russell and those following 
him took themselves to be rebelling against bears little resemblance to the historical Hegel. Rather, as 
Watson (1993, pp.98–100) argues, Russell's target is best viewed as a mythical “shadow” figure, a 
character invented to demarcate and reinforce the identity of analytic philosophy. Hylton's (1990) careful 
study of early analytic philosophy comes to a similar conclusion. While Hylton endorses Russell and 
Moore's rejection of Idealism, he admits that “for every argument that Moore or Russell could mount 
against Idealism, there is an idealist reply which points out a distinction that is being neglected, or one that 
is drawn erroneously; an assumption smuggled in, or the sense of a term distorted” (Hylton 1990, p.105). 
At best, Russell and Moore's break with Idealism represented a Kuhnian revolution, a gestalt switch 
motivated by an enticing alternative rather than a frank engagement with and conclusive refutation of 
1 See, especially, Russell's critique of “the axiom of internal relations”, as recounted in Russell (1975, pp.42–50).
2 Beiser (2007) provides a colourful discussion of the attitude of analytic philosophers to German Idealism in his polemical 
essay, Dark Days. See Westphal (2010) for a more sober discussion of Russell's treatment of Hegel, and its reverberations.
4idealism.3
It is unsurprising, then, that as scholars in the English speaking world regained interest in Hegel 
during the 1970s, what emerged was a new and largely unexplored thinker. In place of the doctrines of 
ontological pantheism and immaterialism once taken to make up the core of Hegel's thinking, Robert B. 
Pippin (1989) sees Hegel fundamentally concerned to think through the consequences of Kant's critical 
project, while Terry Pinkard (1994) lays stress on the social-recognitive account of reason that Hegel 
develops in The Phenomenology of Spirit.4 This new wave of so-called “non-metaphysical” readings has 
begun to facilitate a rehabilitation of Hegel into contemporary debates within analytic philosophy. One 
philosopher who, ambitiously, seeks to set Hegel centre stage in such debates is Robert Brandom.
Brandom had secured his reputation within analytic philosophy before substantially publishing on 
Hegel. An unusual analytic philosopher, both for the breadth of his influences5 and his systemic ambition, 
Brandom seeks to offer a unified and historically sensitive account of language, rationality, logic and 
action. Characteristic of his approach is his pragmatist denial that we can give an adequate account of 
language based on a relation of reference between words and parts of the world (AR 47–55; MIE 67–94). 
Rather, Brandom takes the central feature of rational discursive practice to be inference, which he in turn 
explains in terms of norms of commitment, entitlement and responsibility. This amounts to what he calls a 
“top-down” rather than “bottom-up” semantic explanation (AR 13). Instead of explaining truth in terms of 
reference, and inference in terms of truth preservation, Brandom takes the norms which govern inferences 
to be first in the order of explanation, and attempts to give an account of truth and finally representation in 
terms of these norms. His most detailed and systematic working out of this project remains his 
monumental Making It Explicit (MIE). Even this early work contains a number of scattered references to 
Hegel, but Brandom's most substantial engagement with Hegel occurs in his more recent work, which fills 
out the historical underpinnings of his thought (RP; TMD).
Brandom, however, goes further than the even most non-traditional new-wave scholars in the use 
that he makes of Hegel. Not only is Brandom happy to read Hegel in light of modern thinkers such as 
Quine and Wittgenstein (to whom he sees Hegel’s thought as complimentary; see RP 78–108), he portrays 
many of Hegel's ideas as anticipations of his own. Brandom's Hegel is a pragmatist (PTHI), a conceptual 
holist (HIHP) and, at times, even an inferentialist (HIHP 181). Moreover, Brandom has no scruples 
3 See also Horstmann (1984) for a thorough treatment of Russell's critique of Hegel, and how it misses its mark.
4 Henrich (2003) and Hartmann (1972) laid much of the groundwork for this revival of Hegelianism. While Pippin and 
Pinkard are notable early examples, “non-metaphysical” readings of Hegel are now becoming ubiquitous. See Deligiorgi 
(2006) and Hammer (2007) for an overview of the terrain.
5 Brandom's influences encompass the German Idealists, the American Pragmatists, Frege, the early Heidegger, Sellars, and 
Habermas. See TMD for his debt to Frege, Sellars, Heidegger and the idealists. Brandom (2011a) reveals his relationship to 
the classical pragmatists, while Brandom (2011b) acknowledges Habermas.
5ignoring central elements of Hegel's thought that he does not find amenable to his project. His 
interpretation is furthermore textually liberal, based for the most part on overarching structural features of 
Hegel's work rather than specific textual evidence.
This has lead many critics, such as Rockmore (2001), de Laurentiis (2007) and Falkenroth et al. 
(2008), to write off Brandom's Hegel as something of an American fantasy, a testament to the Anglophone 
world's inability to penetrate classical German philosophy. These critics have for the most part been 
content to show that Brandom fails to faithfully reproduce Hegel's ideas, and leave it at that. The core of 
de Laurentiis's criticisms is encapsulated in his accusation that “conceptual pragmatism attributes to Hegel 
some of its own fundamental theses despite their absence from (and sometimes incompatibility with) 
Hegel’s work” (de Laurentiis 2007, p.91), while Falkenroth et al. (2008, pp.108–111) explain that 
Brandom's reading only captures Hegel's task in the Phenomenology, not in his mature work, the Logic.
Brandom openly admits, however, that his reading “crucially depends on claims that [he, 
Brandom] undertake[s] [...] without claiming that Hegel would have acknowledged them” (TMD 103). In 
order to give a fair assessment of Brandom's treatment of Hegel, it is necessary to pay closer attention than 
these critics have to the terms and criteria of adequacy that Brandom sets himself for textual interpretation. 
Doing so will put us in a position to understand Brandom's hermeneutics, and so motivate the project that 
will occupy us for the body of this work.
1.1 Reading the mighty dead: De dicto and de re
Brandom leads into the historical essays of Tales of the Mighty Dead (TMD 90–120), the book in 
which his first detailed reading of Hegel appears, by giving an account of textual interpretation informed 
by the theory of conceptual content he develops in MIE. He begins by rehearsing the central tenet of his 
inferentialism, that the content of a claim is to be understood in terms of its role in reasoning; as what 
follows from it and what it follows from.6 The inferential consequences of a claim, however, depend on 
what other claims are available for use as concomitant premises. If I know that it is overcast in Melbourne, 
and that it is winter, then I have good reason to think it might rain. However, if instead I know that it is 
summer, then I have no reason to expect rain, since rain in Melbourne is uncommon during the summer, 
cloudy or not. The inferential significance of the fact that it is overcast differs depending on facts about 
the seasons that can be employed in multi-premise inferences.
In the same way, the consequences that an interpreter may infer from the writings of a historical 
6 In the sense of what may be legitimately inferred, not what actually is inferred; hence inference is a normative relation (MIE 
12).
6thinker depend on whether she restricts herself to collateral premises that thinker would have accepted, or 
whether she allows herself to make use of any collateral claim she personally holds true (TMD 94–108). 
For instance, if I import my own belief that the world cannot possibly be the product of a human or divine 
mind, I may be able to take Berkeley's idealism as a reductio against his empiricist starting point, but the 
same move would not be possible if I restrict myself to claims Berkeley himself would have accepted 
(since Berkeley made it clear that he did not take his immaterialist conclusion to be absurd). Picking up on 
the technical theory he develops in MIE (495–547), Brandom calls a reading of the first kind, which aims 
to determine what the author took the content of her claims to be, a “de dicto” reading. On the other hand, 
if the goal of determining what the author thought followed from the text is set aside in favour of 
determining what, from the interpreter's perspective, really follows from the text, then the interpreter is 
undertaking a “de re” reading.7 
The importance of the set of background commitments that the interpreter allows herself becomes 
clear when we observe that Brandom's understanding of conceptual content as inferential role makes 
unavailable any hard and fast theory-language distinction (TMD 91). If the content of a claim is taken to 
be constituted by its inferential role, then the meaning of the claim to be interpreted is itself affected by 
the set of background commitments adopted. Consequently, we cannot suppose a two-phase model of 
interpretation which has the interpreter first setting the meaning of some thinker's claims, and then 
proceeding to interpret them against the background of some further set of commitments (either the 
interpreter's own or the thinker's). There is no text whose meaning can in principle be settled prior to 
adopting a particular inferential perspective. Rather, the process of understanding a claim (or at least of 
making this understanding explicit) just is the process of drawing out its inferential consequences. The 
two phases therefore become inseparable and must proceed simultaneously. The choice whether to 
proceed in the de re or de dicto mode must be made at the outset, since it will, literally on Brandom's 
account, have a hand in determining the identity of the text to be interpreted. To fail to clearly choose an 
inferential perspective before beginning the interpretation, Brandom warns us, is to set oneself up for 
confusion and equivocation about the rules of the interpretative game (TMD 105).8
Brandom refuses to privilege any particular set of background commitments, and claims that both 
7 These terms derive from Brandom's analysis of the role of de dicto and de re propositional attitude ascriptions, which I 
explore in chapter three.
8 Brandom's thinking bears the influence of his teacher Rorty (1984, p.49), who offers a similar description of the interpreter's 
predicament: “Either we anachronistically impose enough of our own problems and vocabulary on the dead to make them 
conversational partners, or we confine our interpretive activity to making their falsehoods look less silly by placing them in 
the context of the benighted times in which they were written”. Rorty adds that “we should do both of these things, but do 
them separately”. Brandom vindicates Rorty's flippant remark with his more sober and technical account of de re and de 
dicto ascriptions. For Brandom, we'll see, ‘imposing’ our own vocabulary and perspective on the dead is a rational necessity.
7de re and de dicto interpretations have merit (TMD 99). Nonetheless, Brandom makes clear that the 
reading he gives of Hegel in TMD falls squarely in the de re category (TMD 103). Furthermore, Brandom 
takes himself to be engaging in an exercise he calls “reconstructive metaphysics” (TMD 111). Rather than 
aiming to faithfully reproduce Hegel's every claim, Brandom sets out to elucidate them by stripping them 
down to their bare essentials and then seeing which of Hegel's remaining ideas can be reconstructed from 
this minimal basis (TMD 112–113). After this process of reconstruction, those that remain unsalvaged are 
to set aside until a reconstruction of them is found (TMD 116–117).
It should now be clear why accusing Brandom of textual faithlessness is insufficient. To do so is 
akin to blaming the electrician for failing to fix the plumbing: It is simply not the task he set out to 
accomplish. For a criticism of Brandom's reading to be effective, it needs to take into account the nature of 
de re interpretation and criticise it as such. The terms of a de re reading as described so far, however, do 
not provide us with any straightforward way to subject it to criticism, and indeed one might worry whether 
the enterprise renders criticism impossible. Since the interpreter openly resolves to proceed by adjoining 
the reconstructed claims to her own set of beliefs and seeing what follows, the critic seems to be able to do 
no more than evaluate whether the interpreter has reasoned soundly. If the interpreter is furthermore free 
to decide which elements of the reconstructed thinkers thought are central, and what can be jettisoned, 
then de re interpretation begins to look, as Pippin (2007, p.153) worries, like a “Get Out of Jail Free Card 
whenever questions about textual fidelity arise”. 
If we are to take Brandom's historical enterprise seriously, we need some way of subjecting 
Brandom's treatment of historical figures to scrutiny that does not shield him from all criticism by making 
his word on the interpretation final. Otherwise, if the only lights by which we can legitimately judge the 
success of such an enterprise are the interpreter's own, then every de re reading will be successful, but 
only because the terms of the project guarantee it cannot fail. One way of gaining the purchase necessary 
to subject a de re reading to criticism is suggested by Brandom's more recent writings.
1.2 Rational reconstruction
In his 2007 Woodbridge Lectures, Animating Ideas of Idealism (RP chap. 1–3), Brandom extends 
and complements the de re model of textual interpretation, linking it more closely to his reading of Hegel 
and his conception of reason itself. In the third and final lecture, History, Reason and Reality (RP 78–108), 
he develops a model of rationality that he attributes to Hegel by using the metaphor of judgement in 
common law. The central feature of common law that Brandom thinks can shed light on our rational 
practice is that in common law, unlike statutory law, the content of legal concepts are not determined by 
8any explicit set of principles or definitions. Rather, all there is to determine the applicability of a legal 
concept in common law is the history of that concept's application, in the form of decisions made by 
previous judges. But crucially, the fact that common law is, as Brandom puts it, “case law all the way 
down” (RP 84), does not mean that judges are permitted to make any decision they please. There are 
determinate norms in play in common law, because each judge must justify her decision by pointing to 
precedents. Looking more closely at how norms in common law are instituted, Brandom thinks, is key to 
understanding the nature of rationality.
Brandom suggests that in an idealised common law scenario, norms are instituted by relationships 
of reciprocal recognition (RP 87). This can be brought out by considering the normative relationships that 
pertain between a current judge and the earlier and later judges that share her tradition. The present judge 
is responsible to all past judges because it is their judgements that she must use to justify her decisions. 
But the present judge also has authority over prior judges since she can refuse to take a judgement as 
precedential. The authority she exercises over prior judges, however, is counterbalanced by the authority 
future judges exert over her. For if her judgement is too far out of line, then future judges will not be able 
to take this judgement as precedential, and the current judge will thereby be deprived of her status as 
normatively relevant. In so far as she does successfully justify her judgement by judiciously selecting 
precedents, however, the current judgement will itself set a precedent and future judges will become 
responsible to the present judge. In this way, every judge stands in relationships of authority and 
responsibility to every other judge, and it is precisely these relationships that institute and generate the 
conceptual norms in play.
Brandom uses this model of rationality to bolster his interpretative enterprise by highlighting the 
historical dimension of judgement conceived on this model (RP 92–108). In order to make the justification 
for her decision fully explicit, a judge must not only make a case for the precedents she points to, but also 
explain why those judges who set the precedents were judicious in their choosing, and so on. In this way, a 
judge justifies her decision by reconstructing a rational history of the concepts involved, ignoring those 
judgments that she deems non-precedential, and emphasising those that are. She picks out and privileges a 
particular trajectory of past judgements and allows them to be seen as presenting ever-more veridical 
appearances by successively resolving conflicts and tensions, culminating in her own view. This is 
precisely what is involved in taking one's views to represent reality (RP 100). Brandom accordingly 
contends that if we think of rationality in this way, then far from being sloppy scholarship, his 
interpretation of Hegel is an example of Hegelian reason par excellence. Ignoring all but those elements of 
Hegel's thought that Brandom deems relevant is, on this reading, just what Hegel recommends (RP 107–
108).
9Thinking of reconstructive metaphysics on the common law model reveals what sort of criticisms 
a reconstructive de re reading is vulnerable to, by its own standards. In order to take a history to be a 
rational reconstruction, the interpreter must see it as culminating in a view of things as they really are. If 
the rational reconstruction culminates in the thought of some historical thinker (as Brandom's RP leads up 
to Hegel's), then by presenting the history in that way, the interpreter has also committed herself to what 
she takes to be that thinker's position. As a result, rational reconstruction blurs the distinction between the 
interpreter and the interpreted, and accordingly, criticism of the interpretation becomes possible by way of 
criticism of the interpreter.
Thus, while the reconstructive metaphysician is shielded against charges of textual omission 
(since picking and choosing is of the essence in a rational reconstruction) and textual misconstrual (since 
the interpreter openly resolves to understand the significance of a claim by her own lights, not those of the 
interpreted), rational reconstruction opens the interpreter to criticism of a different kind. If we are able to 
successfully point out a problem with the interpreter's own position that she takes to be a rational 
reconstruction of the some thinker, then we will have successfully criticised the interpretation as well. Put 
another way, rational reconstruction reverses the old dictum that the author should not be confused her 
characters. It forces us to identify the two by merging the interpretative acts of exposition and evaluation. 
Criticism remains possible, but it becomes impossible to say whether the criticism is merely of the 
interpretation, or of the position the interpreter adopts as a result of her interpretation.
1.3 Methodology
In what follows, I will trace out an alternative historical trajectory to Brandom's, beginning with 
Kant, and progressing through Hegel and Frege to Brandom. I hope to show that a serious tension exists 
between Kantian-Fregean and Hegelian ways of thinking about objects and objectivity, and that 
Brandom's much-touted Hegelianism falls under the weight of his commitments to Kant and Frege. This 
will make the difficulties Brandom has in appropriating Hegelian thought both visible and explicable. At 
the same time, it will reveal problems with Brandom's own account of objectivity.
The approach I adopt bears many similarities with Brandom's method of rational reconstruction. 
This is deliberate: By engaging with the history that Brandom takes his own work to rely upon, I hope to 
enable a certain kind of internal critique by meeting Brandom on his own terms. I will take up the position 
of a contemporary common-law judge who challenges the rationality of another's judgement by pointing 
to alternative precedents, ones which shed doubt on Brandom's claim to be the torchbearer of 
Hegelianism. The method adopted here also differs importantly from Brandom's, however. Whereas the 
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goal of a rational reconstruction is primarily positive – to present a Whiggish trajectory culminating in the 
position that one takes to be reality – mine will be primarily negative. I aim to identify incompatibilities 
between certain lines of thought that cause them to resist homogenisation into a single view, by disclosing 
problems and tensions that Brandom inherits from his antecedents, specifically as regard the notions of 
object and objectivity.
In arguing that Hegelian and Kantian-Fregean ways of thinking about objects and objectivity are 
incompatible, and that Brandom's reading of Hegel (as well as the correlative features of Brandom's own 
thought) are flawed due to a failure to come to grips with this incompatibility, I will implicitly be taking a 
personal stand on the philosophical issues involved. I will be arguing that, by my lights, these 
commitments are incompatible, and in that sense what I present falls on the de re side of Brandom's 
divide. Nevertheless, I intend to subordinate the goal of forming and defending my personal stand on these 
issues to that of giving a historical explanation of Brandom's difficulties.
The scope of this work allows this task to be undertaken only in a highly abridged form, and 
often it will be possible to do no more than gesture in the direction of the relevant moves and ideas. 
Nonetheless, my intention is that the level of detail I present will suffice to make the outline of this 
historical trajectory visible. I begin by examining the connection between Kant's conception of objectivity 
and his pluralistic ontology, and investigate how Hegel rejected Kant's account of objectivity by providing 
an alternative characterisation of the structure of intentionality. I then go on to analyse Brandom's 
interpretation of Hegel's objective idealism, and explore various tensions between it and other parts of 
Brandom's philosophy. Finally, I trace these difficulties back to latent Kantian features of Brandom's 
thought that he inherits both directly and through Frege. Brandom's wholehearted adoption of Frege's 
conception of the object leads to an essentially Kantian account of objectivity. With these materials in 
hand, it will be possible to explicate difficulties faced by Brandom's reading of Hegel.
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2 Objects and objectivity in Kant and Hegel
Beiser's (2002) epic survey of German philosophy in the last two decades of the 18th century 
offers a novel interpretation of the period. Brushing aside the received view of the post-Kantian idealists 
as champions of the transcendental subject, Beiser (Beiser 2002, p.6) instead characterises the movement 
as “the progressive de-subjectivisation of the Kantian legacy”. In this chapter, I will briefly explore one 
stage upon which this “de-subjectivisation” took place by showing how Hegel reacted to and revised 
Kant's conception of the object. I begin by rehearsing Kant's account of objective validity, and then go on 
to examine Hegel's objection that the conception of objectivity Kant was able to deliver was too weak to 
rule out radical scepticism. Hegel's solution is an ambitious synthesis of Kantian and Aristotelian 
conceptions of the object, which aims to redeem essentialism in a post-critical, teleological framework.
2.1 Kant on objects and objective validity
In the First Critique, Kant distinguishes two meta-concepts that might broadly be termed 
“objectivity”. For a representation to possess objective reality (objektive Realität) is for there to be some 
actually existing object to which it corresponds, or in the case of a judgement, for it to be true. Objective 
validity (objektive Gültigkeit), on the other hand, is the weaker condition that there merely be a possible 
object to which the representation corresponds. Failure to possess objective reality is failure to be 
instantiated or veridical, while to lack objective validity is to fail to be so much as meaningful (Hanna 
2001, p.84). In his pursuit of the semantic question, “what is the ground of the reference of that in us 
which we call ‘representation’ to the object?”,9 Kant develops a distinctive account of the latter notion.
As Hanna (2001, p.84) carefully expounds, Kant took objective validity to consist in three weaker 
sub-conditions. A minimally necessary, but not sufficient condition for objective validity is that a 
representation be self-consistent. Thus, the objective validity of “non-human human” is ruled out. For 
Kant, however, self-consistency only guarantees that a representation is thinkable and not “whether […] 
there is a corresponding object somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities” (CPR Bxxvi). In order 
to ensure that a representation corresponds to a genuinely and not just putatively possible object, Kant 
invokes the spontaneous unifying activity of the subject to whom the representation belongs. Kant appeals 
to the fact that any representation applicable to a possible object must be able to feature in a unified, single 
consciousness to conclude that what makes a representation more than formally possible is that it be 
bound by the rules which govern the conceptual network of the apperceiving subject (CPR A91/B124, 
9 Kant (1967, pp.129–30), quoted in Hanna (2001, p.17).
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A105ff., B130ff.). Thus, the subject bridges the gap between a representation which is merely well-formed 
and one which is genuinely possible in the sense that it can support rational connections to other 
representations (Hanna 2001, pp.86–87).
However, since concepts are formally capable of being applied even to things of which we could 
in principle have no knowledge (CPR A238/B298), Kant insists that formal validity and synthetic unity 
only suffice for a concept to be possible for some consciousness, not necessarily for one like ours. Kant 
wishes to rule out representations which correspond to an object possible only for a radically different 
kind of consciousness, for instance one which could intuit concepts, since “our functions for thinking 
would still be without any significance in regard to it” (CPR A286/B342) and “so far as I could know, 
there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought could be applied” (CPR B146, quoted 
in Hanna 2001, p.88). Hence, Kant requires one final condition for genuine objective validity. Besides 
being well-formed and synthetically unified, a conceptual representation must furthermore be tied back to 
our forms of sensibility, viz. the intuitions (Hanna 2001, p.88).
Robert Stern (1990) sheds a great deal of light on Kant's doctrine by presenting it as a response to 
problems with the conception of the object that he inherits from the empiricists. Locke and Hume's 
rejection of the reality of substances had the effect of reducing objects to mere “bundles” of simple ideas 
with no inherent connection to each other (Stern 1990, p.7). In keeping with his sceptical approach, Hume 
accounted for the unity of objects in purely psychological terms. We experience certain quantities to be 
unified in a single object when we are strongly habituated to associate those qualities with one another. 
However, over and above this habit of association, Hume insisted that there is no underlying substrate 
grounding this perceived unity (Stern 1990, pp.7–14).
Kant recognized that this explanation was lacking in two vital respects. The first problem pertains 
to the psychologism of the account: While it explains how perceptions are connected in our minds, it does 
not explain how the qualities they are perceptions of are related in the purportedly mind-independent 
object (Stern 1990, p.12). Secondly, Hume's account could not explain why some qualities, for example 
mass and extension, must necessarily occur together in any object (Stern 1990, p.12). Kant expresses the 
point succinctly: “Experience teaches us, to be sure, that something is constituted thus and so, but not that 
it could not be otherwise” (CPR B3).
Unsatisfied with the empiricists' inability to account for the necessary coincidence of qualities 
within an object, yet also wishing to resist the dogmatic appeal to an imperceptible, mind-independent 
substance, Kant needed a new way to account for the unity of the object. His solution was, in a phrase, his 
Copernican Revolution. While affirming that we cannot but think of the properties inhering in an object as 
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dependent on a substance (CPR B6), Kant forged a via media between positing an imperceptible, mind-
independent substance and giving in to Humean scepticism by accounting for the unity of the object in 
terms of the conditions of the subject's experience: 
Combination does not lie in the objects, [...] and cannot as it were be borrowed from them through 
perception and by that means first taken up into the understanding, but is rather only an operation 
of the understanding, which is itself nothing further than the faculty of combining a priori and 
bringing the manifold of given representations under unity of apperception, which principle is the 
supreme one in the whole of human cognition (CPR B134–5). 
On Allison's (2004, pp.89–90) and Hanna's (2001, pp.89–90) readings, it is pivotal to making 
sense of Kant's position that we recognise this move as involving a revision and circumscription of the 
concept of object. Kant shifts the semantically relevant notion from what it is to be an object to what it is  
to be an object, for a creature like us. He sees himself licensing this move by having shown that objects as 
they are in themselves (or indeed for any creature radically different from us) can have no meaning for us, 
and thus, from our finite standpoint, are effectively no objects at all. This relativisation of the object to the 
human standpoint, however, rendered Kant's account of objectivity unacceptable in the eyes of Hegel.
2.2 Hegel on Kantian objectivity
In this section, I examine Hegel's comments on objectivity in the context of his discussion of 
Kantian philosophy in the 1830 Encyclopedia (E).10 We'll see that Hegel rejects Kant's account of 
objectivity because, although it addresses Humean scepticism, it opens the door to scepticism of a more 
radical kind. After giving an indication of the sort of move Hegel thinks is required to avoid this pitfall, I'll 
attempt to reconstruct, in broad outline, Hegel's proposed alternative.
In the course of positioning himself in relation to Kant in the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel 
distinguishes three senses of the word “objectivity [Objektivität]”:
To start with, it has the significance of what is externally present [des äußerlich Vorhandenen], as 
distinct from what is only subjective, meant, dreamed, etc.; secondly, it has the significance, 
established by Kant, of what is universal and necessary as distinct from the contingent, particular 
and subjective that we find in our sensation; and thirdly, it has the last-mentioned significance of 
the In-itself as a product-thought [des gedachten Ansich], the significance of what is there, as 
distinct from what is only thought by us, and hence still distinct from the matter itself [von der 
10 Since my main goal is to explain what Hegel objected to in Kant's idealism, I will not be concerned with assessing the 
accuracy of Hegel's reading of Kant. See Priest (1992, pp.17–28) for a thorough appraisal of Hegel's reading.
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Sache selbst], or the matter in-itself [an sich] (E 83, §41 Z2)11
It is worth examining these three meanings in detail, since they encapsulate what Hegel took to 
be wrong with Kant's conception of objectivity, and point to how he sought to remedy it. The first 
meaning Hegel associates with “objectivity” corresponds to our pre-theoretical, everyday use of the term. 
Hegel takes the determining feature of what is objective in this sense to be its externality from us. As he 
puts it earlier in the same passage, “in ordinary language, to be ‘objective’ is to be present outside us and 
to come to us from outside through perception” (E 82, §41 Z2).
Hegel notes that Kant appears at first to have inverted this meaning, since Kant refers to what is 
impressed upon us from without as “subjective”, and reserves the term “objective” for the universal and 
the necessary dimension of our thought (E 82, §41 Z2). Hegel explains, however, that Kant's usage of 
these terms is not a mere Sprachverwirrung, since Kant employs them to make a point about thought-
independence rather than externality (E 83, §41 Z2). He understands Kant to have argued that objects of 
perception, while indeed external to us, are nonetheless subjective in the sense that they must conform to 
the subject's forms of thought. The faculty determining these forms, on the other hand, is objective just in 
the sense that it is independent of and not constrained by the objects which impress upon it.
Nonetheless, Hegel contends that Kant's claim to have demonstrated the objective validity of 
cognition means something significantly weaker than it would have in the mouths of his pre-critical 
predecessors. Kant is able to secure a semantic connection between the subject and its object of 
knowledge only by shifting talk of the object-in-itself to the object-as-it-appears-to-us. A connection can 
then be guaranteed, because Kant establishes that the necessary and general features of objects as they 
appear are imparted by the very cognitive faculty that consumes them (E 81 §41). The suit fits because it's 
tailor-made. The problem, for Hegel, is that that Kant's anthropocentrised conception of the object leaves 
us with no guarantee that the purportedly objective features of reality are any more than creations of the 
transcendental ego (E 84 §42, §42 Z1). Since, on Hegel's reading, Kant's idealism extends both to the 
sensuous matter and the conceptual form of judgement (Schnädelbach 2000, p.30), the contribution of the 
object itself to the cognition becomes utterly minimal. There is, ex hypothesi, no guarantee that the 
properties we experience to be united in a single object are the result of any constraint by the object itself, 
since their coincidence is explained by way of our independent, synthetic activity. At best, then, Kant can 
hold that there is something mind-independent responsible for our cognition, but he must concede that any 
determinate feature of the object is the work of the mind (E 86, §42 Z3).
Hegel's reading of Kant coincides with that of some recent commentators. For example, 
11 Hegel makes a similar point in the Science of Logic (SL 516; HW VI 256).
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Greenberg (2008, pp.2, 17–41) defends Kant's account of necessity by attesting to the objective, mind-
independent reality of objects on Kant's account, but viewing these objects as mere “initiators” of 
thoughts, admitting that “the necessity of specific properties and relations that are ascribed to our 
appearances of initiators is due entirely to the mind”. The similarity of Hegel's reading is evidenced by his 
happy admission that Kant's transcendental deduction does indeed entail the existence (“bloßen Existenz”) 
or being (“Sein”) of a reality outside the subject (HW IIX 118, §42 Z3), but that its “generality and 
necessity” (E 81, §41) is imparted by the subject. Hegel's point, however, is that this this hardly amounts 
to a proof of the “objectivity” of the categories: “If mere existence [Existenz] be enough to make 
objectivity”, he writes, “[then] even a crime is objective” (Hegel 1975, p.65, §42 Z3).12
Hegel therefore takes Kant's doctrine of transcendental objectivity to be in a third sense radically 
subjective, since it rules out the very possibility of genuine knowledge of the object. Thus, while Kant's 
transcendental idealism indeed circumvents Humean scepticism, it does so at what Hegel considers the 
unacceptably high price of separating the subject permanently from the purported object of knowledge. 
Hegel concludes that Kant and Fichte were, in Pippin's (1989, p.92) words, “skeptics, philosophers who 
finally undercut their own results by admitting that they have no way of establishing that the conditions 
for a possibly self-conscious experience of objects are genuinely objective”. Putting the point in religious 
terms, Pippin (1989, pp.92–93) suggests that Hegel saw Kant and Fichte enacting “a Christian, religious 
tragedy” by reserving knowledge of things in themselves for a non-human, divine standpoint. It is largely 
a desire to avoid this self-defeating subjectivism while respecting Kant's central insights, Pippin (1989) 
argues, that motivates Hegel to develop his own philosophical system.13 
The solution to this Kantian impasse that Hegel presents in the Vorbegriff is to resist jumping 
from what he sees as Kant's correct insight that the categories are determinations of thought to the 
conclusion that they are merely a reflection of the subject's cognitive makeup (E 85–86, §42 Z3). 
“Although the categories (e.g. unity, cause and effect, etc.) pertain to thinking as such, it does not at all 
follow from this that they must therefore be merely something of ours, and not also determinations of the 
ob-jects [sic] themselves” (E 85–86, §42 Z3). It's important to emphasise that Hegel does not challenge 
Kant's claim that the object is a product of the subject's synthesis rather than a given of experience. 
Indeed, he asserts that “regarding the content of [Kant's] subjective idealism we do not have to lift a 
finger” (E 86, §42 Z3). Rather, he attempts to re-work Kant's subjective idealism into an objective 
idealism (OI) by denying Kant's inference from the activity of the subject to the conclusion that the 
12 I use the older Wallace translation here (Hegel 1975), because the more recent one (E) obscures the emphasis on 
“objectivity” that I wish to bring out here.
13 See also Forster (1989) and Franks (2005) for discussions of Hegel's philosophical development in terms of the threat of 
scepticism.
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objects of our experience are mere phenomena, forever cut off from the noumena. This inference, Hegel 
thought, relied on a fundamentally misguided metaphysics of intentionality which he sought to correct 
with his Science of Logic (SL).
2.3 Ontology and the “chemical” model of cognition
In the introduction to SL, Hegel claims that “the objective logic thus takes the place […] of the 
former metaphysics”, adding that “it is ontology which objective logic most directly replaces” (SL 42). 
Most commentators agree that this showed Hegel meant his Logic to be the successor science to 
traditional metaphysics, rather than a reversion to pre-critical metaphysics (Horstmann 1984, p.45; Fulda 
2003, p.99; Pippin 1989, pp.176–178). There is less consensus as to why he thought this and how he 
intended his SL to take up this mantle. H. F. Fulda's (2003) commentary provides a starting point. Fulda 
(2003, pp.99–100) understand Hegel's mature logic as a systematic attempt to overcome the persistent 
view that cognition can be factorised into two components, one purely objective and another purely 
subjective, like two elements that are combined in a chemical compound. According to Fulda (2003, 
p.100), Hegel thinks that this view of judgement problematically presupposes a “conceptual opposition 
between a self-standing [fürsichseiend] subject – with all that belongs to it – and an independent object, 
with its attributes, given in thought”.14
Despite his insistence that the object is a product of synthesis, and so not an experiential given, 
such a distinction persists in Kant. Cognition, in Kant's system, consists in the application of a concept to 
an intuition, where the former is the free activity of the subject and the latter stands in for sense 
impressions (CPR A50/B74). Hegel holds that the sceptical conclusions of Kant's transcendental idealism 
follow only because Kant thought that cognition must be able to be factorised into mutually exclusively 
subjective and objective components. When Kant's insight that the free activity of the subject permeates 
all aspects of cognition is followed through under the assumption that the contribution of the subject must 
be principally distinct from that of the object, the extent of the subject's activity causes the objective 
contribution to all but vanish. However, by rejecting this “chemical” (Fulda 2003, p.99) model of 
cognition, the possibility is opened for conceiving of the activity of the subject in a way that does not set it 
at odds with the object.
In Hegel's view, Kant's acceptance of the chemical model of cognition was not a dogmatic 
oversight, but rather an inevitable consequence of his philosophical approach. Kant had motivated his first 
14 The translation is my own. Fulda's text reads “Dabei wird ein begrifflicher Gegensatz zwischen einem fürsichseienden 
Subjekt – mit allem, was zu ihm gehört – und einem selbständigen, dem Denken vorgegebenen Objekt mit seinen 
Merkmalen unterstellt”
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critique by bemoaning the “battlefield” that metaphysics had become (CPR Avii–viii). In order to place 
metaphysics on the sure path to a Wissenschaft, Kant thought the philosopher needed to begin by 
determining the limits of reason, a challenge to which the First Critique would rise. However, by first 
asking after the conditions of experience, Kant reduced the world to the realm of appearances, and since 
the transcendental subject was the most basic condition of any such appearance, it had always to be 
presupposed. The gravamen that united the early romantics and post-Kantians after Fichte was that this 
effectively exiled the subject from the world of experience. The subject, because a condition of any 
phenomena, could find no place in the realm of phenomena at all (Kneller 2007, pp.38–59).
Kant saw this conclusion as a great boon. It meant that the transcendental subject must be 
noumenal, and so it could act freely, unencumbered by the constraints of the phenomenal world (Kneller 
2007, p.43). Yet this also had the effect of establishing a duality between subject and object. Since the 
objects of experience and the transcendental subject itself belonged to two different spheres, a dichotomy 
between the subjective and objective contributions to cognition was inevitable. Thus the chemical model 
of cognition, along with its sceptical consequences.
In order to overcome this, Hegel emphasises that the entire Kantian drama – the finite subject's 
synthesis of the phenomenal world and inescapable sense of an inaccessible thing-in-itself beyond it – 
must, in some sense, take place in the world. What is needed to do justice to this insight is a conception of 
reality that can encompass the entire structure of finite cognition, including the activity of the cognisant 
subject. As Gabriel and Žižek (2009, p.3) put it: “The whole domain of the representation of the world [...] 
needs to be understood as an event within and of the world itself”. If this vision could be achieved, then 
the subject appear once more a denizen of the world, and cognition would cease to look like the 
combination of elements from two different realms.
Hegel's project was therefore ontological, not in the pre-critical sense of giving an inventory of 
the basic components of reality, but rather in that that he sought to avoid Kant's scepticism by viewing the 
limits of knowledge as features of reality itself. This did not amount to projecting our cognitive 
psychology onto the world in a pre-Kantian fashion, but rather to the insistence that the thing in itself must 
be thought of as fundamentally inclusive of the subject, rather than opposed to it. Kant's insights into the 
subject's finitude would not be disregarded, but rather transposed from an epistemic to an ontological key, 
so as to respect the insight that our limitedness is itself part of the world (Gabriel & Žižek 2009, pp.5–6). 
To see how Hegel carries out this manoeuvre, it is helpful to examine Robert Stern's interpretation of 
Hegel's ontology. Stern, I will argue, does not get to the heart of Hegel's solution, but determining where 
his reading falls short will bring us closer to Hegel's position.
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2.4 Kant, Aristotle and Hegel's ontology
As discussed above, Stern observes that Kant's invocation of the subject in order to unify the 
object is only necessary because of the atomistic starting point that he inherits from the empiricists. 
According to Stern (1990, pp.40–42), Hegel resists Kant's subjectivism by instead affirming an 
Aristotelian conception of the object, considering the object to have an inherent unity in virtue of 
exhibiting an irreducible substance-kind. In keeping with the romantic tendency to prefer organic holism 
to mechanistic atomism, he rejects Kant's presupposition that the world inherently consists of disparate 
intuitions in need of unification by a subject and replaces it with an Aristotelian essentialism according to 
which universals constitute the essence or true nature of a thing per se (Stern 1990, pp.30–45). He thereby 
circumvents the need for Kantian synthesis by taking the object to possess an inherent unity in itself (Stern 
1990, p.75).
Hegel does ultimately adopt an essentialist position, but it is misleading to portray him in this 
way, as if he simply pitted Aristotle's view against Kant's. The most explicit piece of textual evidence in 
support of Stern's view is at the beginning of his shorter Logic, where Hegel draws a division between the 
permanent inner nature of a thing and its external being. There he follows Aristotle in arguing that 
although the universal exists in its instances, we should resist thinking of a genus as a mere collection, 
since we can only understand what each member of the collection is in so far as we consider it as a “this-
such”, an instance of its kind (E 56–58, §24).
The context of Hegel's statement however makes clear that his position owes more to Kant than 
Stern recognises. The preceeding sections (§21–23) emphasise the Kantian point that the subject is active 
in the manufacture and revelation of the object. Following Kant, Hegel affirms that the object is “the 
product of my freedom” (E 55, §23) and that “thinking it over [Nachdenken] changes something in the 
way that the content is at first [given]”(E 54, §22). However, Hegel emphasises against Kant that this 
needn't separate “the In-itself […] from what we make of [it]” (E 54, §22). On the contrary, Hegel 
suggests that it is “through the mediation of an alteration that the true nature of the ob-ject [sic] comes 
into consciousness” (E 54, §22). That is, the subject recognises the object as it is in itself by changing it. In 
order for this position to be coherent, Hegel will require a new conception of the object, as I explore 
below (p. 20). However, the fact that Hegel emphasises the object's being a “product of my spirit, [of me] 
as thinking subject” (E 55, §23) demonstrates that Hegel does not take the object to be a ready-made this-
such, as Stern suggests.
Hegel's first step toward giving an account of the object that will avoid the pitfalls of Kant's 
19
position, while preserving his idealism, is to commit to providing an account of thought as itself a worldly 
affair. As discussed above, Hegel takes it that beginning with an ontological separation of the free thinking 
subject and the object of thought will irrevocably lead to Kantian scepticism. Instead, then, Hegel affirms 
that “thoughts can be called objective thoughts”, which is to say that “understanding, or reason, [is] in the 
world” (E 56, §24).
In a Zusatz, or addition, Hegel then gives a recognisably Aristotelian account of essences in order 
to allay the worry that he is endorsing some kind of pan-psychism, explaining that it is the determinations 
of thought in the form of category universals that pertain to objects, rather than some ephemeral 
consciousness or ghost-in-the-machine. Hegel's placatory discussion of essentialism here is only 
necessary, however, because of how much of Kant's view he adopts. It is only because of his Kantian 
admission that the object is a product of thought, together with his commitment to the objectivity of 
thought, that the threat of pan-psychism he addresses with Aristotelian essentialism arises at all. The 
invocation of an “inner nature” given by a category universal serves to show the objective sense in which 
thought can be “in the world” without “consciousness […] being ascribed to natural things” (E 56, §24 
Z1). The Aristotelian point is accordingly subsidiary to Hegel's overarching idealism.
Hegel's distance from Aristotle can be brought still more sharply into view by observing that 
while Hegel is dissatisfied with Kant's solution to the unity of the object, he is equally dissatisfied with the 
approach of traditional metaphysics, which circumvents Kantian criticism by stipulating a substance 
ontology that mirrors the forms of judgement.15 Proceeding in this way is still compatible with the 
chemical model of cognition, only now, instead of emphasising the activity of the subject at the expense of 
the objective, the inherent unity of the object is touted to such an extent that the activity of the subject 
becomes practically redundant. It is telling that Stern (1990) has little to say about Hegel's epistemology. 
In fact, as Horstmann (1990, pp.23–40) explores, Hegel rejected the stipulation of an Aristotelian 
substance ontology because it presupposed a dogmatic epistemology and semantics: It simply assumed 
that the forms of judgement map onto the ontological structure of the world.
According to Horstmann, Hegel attempts to navigate the unsatisfactory extremes of subjective 
idealism and dogmatic metaphysics by independently developing a concept of the object, and 
subsequently investigating the connection of this ontology to the forms of judgement. Hegel's key 
ontological move, however, is to insist that the modification of the object in thought is necessary for the 
development and realisation of its essence. That the subject's thinking plays an actively constitutive role in 
15 Indeed, the preceding section of the Vorbegriff (E 65–76) is devoted to a criticism of “metaphysics” on precisely these 
grounds. Horstmann (1990) orients his concise introduction to Hegel's philosophy around this point.
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the constitution of the object is an idea Hegel owes largely to Kant. But by viewing the activity of the 
subject as an ontological condition of the unfolding of the object's “true nature” (E 54, §22), Hegel is able 
to resist the Kantian conclusion that the activity of the subject cuts us off from the thing in itself. In this 
way he can be seen to aim for a conception of the object that will facilitate a synthesis of the Aristotelian 
and Kantian models of cognition, as Schnädelbach (2000, p.32) argues. To see the distinctive character of 
Hegel's essentialism, we need to consider another aspect of Hegel's conception of the structure of the 
object, also motivated by a deficiency he finds in Kant, this time in the Third Critique.
2.5 The teleological route to essentialism
Famously, Kant had explained away the apparent purposiveness of nature by reducing 
teleological judgement to a regulative capacity (CJ 234). While Kant was happy to allow that certain kinds 
of object could only be explained by invoking final causes, he insisted that such explanations have merely 
subjective validity. Teleological judgement is effective not because nature contains an extra, non-
mechanistic variety of causation, but rather because certain purely mechanical processes are best 
understood by projecting features of our subjectivity onto them. Thus Kant writes:
teleological judging is rightly drawn into our research into nature, at least problematically, but only 
in order to bring it under principles of observation and research in analogy with causality 
according to ends, without presuming thereby to explain it (CJ 234)
As Horstmann (1990, pp.48–50) explains, this established two dualities that Hegel found 
unpalatable. Firstly, it created a cognitive dichotomy regarding valid judgements, by according some 
objective and others merely subjective validity. Second, it drew a problematic ontological divide between 
objects that are amenable to teleological explanation and those amenable to mechanistic explanation. 
Hegel's reasons for objecting to these dualities are largely the same as those discussed above. In parallel to 
the way Kant's account of the unity of the object invited scepticism, Kant's discussion of teleology 
subjectivised the objective and thereby threatened the status of our knowledge. Having objected to Kant's 
account of objectivity for being covertly subjective, Hegel all the more staunchly rejects Kant's overtly 
subjective account of teleological judgement (E 104, §58).
In order to overcome these dualities, Hegel abandons the Kantian priority of mechanism, and 
instead proposes what Horstmann (1990, p.46) terms an “organological [organologisches]” model of the 
object. Rather than presuppose a world of externally connected, causally determined mechanism, and then 
have the subject project a teleological framework onto it, Hegel suggests that what it is to be an object is 
just to display the kind of inner purposiveness characteristic of organisms (Horstmann 1990, pp.46–48, 
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60–62). This teleological approach to objecthood then allows essences to reappear in a new guise, no 
longer as static, determinate universals, but rather as the inner potential that a thing realises in its 
development. The essence of the flower is the fruit (PPS 66); the concept, the idea (SL 670–675).
Having given his essentialism this developmental aspect, the way is then open for a 
reinterpretation of Kant's idealism. Recall that for Hegel, Kant's central insight was that the subject does 
not passively receive but modifies the object in thought. Since on this organic model the object must 
anyway develop in order to manifest its true nature, Hegel can simply interpret the contributory activity of 
the subject's thought as the process by which the object manifests its essence. In this way Hegel can accept 
what he calls the “content” (E 86, §42 Z3) of Kant's idealism, the subject's spontaneity, without admitting 
Kant's subjectivism. Note the dovetail between Hegel's teleological essentialism and his objective 
idealism. The difference between what an object appears to be now and what it is striving to become 
makes space for the synthesising subject to play an objectively significant role. Looking to examples of 
organisms in nature reveals that a reliance of one developmental process on another needn't amount to a 
hierarchical subsumption. A chick relies on its mother to feed it, but what the mother nurtures is the 
chick's independent development (she doesn't grow its wings). In the same way, the object relies on the 
subject for its realisation in thought, but is not thereby reduced to a mere creation of the subject.
This metaphor, of course, provides only a basic schema for filling out Hegel's objective idealism. 
It would take us too far afield to discuss the vital but difficult question of how the subject's activity of 
modification might facilitate the object's own development. A useful but, I think, ultimately too simplistic 
answer is provided by David Lamb's (1992) Marxist reading of Hegel's teleology. On Lamb's reading, the 
subject literally manufactures the object in the process of labour. Labour imbues blind nature with purpose 
by turning certain mechanisms on others, making them work for us, and thus “the teleology-mechanism 
dichotomy can be transcended by locating conscious human purpose within the causal network, without 
destroying it, or going beyond it” (Lamb 1992, p.175). Helpful as Lamb's idea is, it does not yet explain 
how thought might enable the object's development outside of the labour process, in the more passive 
relation of reflection.
Nonetheless, even in this skeletal form, Hegel's organological model of the object displays a 
distinctive mode of response to the Kantian, and an alternative to the chemical model of cognition. By 
having the object develop in thought, the organological model places the objective content neither ‘out 
there’ nor ‘in the mind.’ Rather, content is viewed as a process that necessarily incorporates both the 
subject and its world. It is therefore a first step towards making the transition from Kant's subjective 
idealism to Hegel's objective idealism, by providing it with the ontological underpinnings it requires.
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2.6 Conclusion
The aim of this section has been to retell the story of Hegel's break with Kant, highlighting the 
centrality of ontological concerns to their differences. I want to close by drawing together to a number of 
features of this account that will become important in subsequent chapters. Hegel's dissatisfaction with 
Kant revolves around his subjectivism. He resists Kant's fall into scepticism by denying that the subject's 
free activity must be distinct from the object of its knowledge, which in turn requires a re-conception of 
the object and our relation to it. This does not amount to a dogmatic return to pre-critical metaphysics, but 
rather a transposition of Kant's transcendental epistemology onto the object itself. Thus, while Hegel does 
ultimately adopt a form of essentialism, he entitles himself to this view by revising the concept of essence 
to make it compatible with the insights he wishes to hold onto from Kant. By introducing an organic, 
teleological notion of objecthood, Hegel reinterprets Kant's epistemology at the level of ontology, yielding 
an idealised form of Aristotelian essentialism.
Teleological essentialism is a position bound to strike us as quaint or bizarre, and it has not been 
my goal to defend it.16 Perhaps there are more natural ways Hegel could have countervailed the competing 
claims of Kantianism and Aristotelianism. I do however hope to have shown that Hegel's position is not 
without good motivation. Ontological, rather than merely semantic or epistemological concerns need to be 
addressed to accept Kant's doctrine of synthesis without accepting Kant's subjectivised notion of the 
object. And this, of course, holds for any philosopher who finds herself in the same predicament.
16 Positions along the same lines are however not altogether wanting for adherents today. See Thompson (2008, pp.25–84) for 
an able defence of Hegel's treatment of life as a basic logical category.
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3 Brandom's Hegel
Having highlighted some central features of Hegel's objective idealism, I now move on to discuss 
Brandom's de re reconstruction of Hegel's position. Though Brandom traces a number of his ideas back to 
Hegel, I will focus specifically on his reading of Hegel's objective idealism. Brandom's interpretative 
methodology makes it impossible to present his interpretation without also presenting his arguments for it, 
as discussed in the Introduction. Accordingly, I will begin by presenting Brandom's reconstruction of 
Hegel's objective idealism, comprising both his interpretation and defence. Most of Brandom's rhetorical 
effort is spent distinguishing his interpretation from the metaphysically extravagant doctrines that have 
traditionally been associated with Hegel's name. The steps Brandom is driven to take in order to safeguard 
his view, however, ironically threaten the very basis of his Hegelianism. Furthermore, bringing into view 
Brandom's own semantic commitments from MIE reveals that his objective idealism is ambiguous and 
misleadingly framed.
3.1 The promise of inferentialism
In the previous section, I suggested that Hegel sought to overcome the problems that beset prior 
epistemological theories, including Kant's, by rejecting the idea that cognition can be happily described as 
a combination of independent subjective and objective elements. In the twentieth century, specific 
instances of this idea were attacked by Wilfrid Sellars (1997, p.45) in his own “incipient Meditations  
Hegeliènnes”. Under the banner of the “myth of the given,” Sellars (1997, pp.68–79) rejected the 
existence of epistemically relevant, non-inferentially elicited beliefs that presuppose no other beliefs. He 
thereby rebuked the notion that observations form an extricable foundation for knowledge, an “ultimate 
court of appeal” that is independent from our practice of inference (Sellars 1997, p.69). Even such non-
inferentially elicited beliefs, Sellars (1997, pp.68–79) argued, must be caught up in our game of giving 
and asking for reasons, on pain of making them epistemically otiose. Sellars thereby undermined a certain 
form of the chemical model, which would seek to distil cognition into a purely objective substrate of sense 
data that the purely subjective activity of inference then goes to work on.
While Sellars' attacks on the myth of the given are renowned, his positive sketch of an alternative 
to mythical givenness has not received equal acclaim, being generally considered to be underdeveloped or 
impossibly opaque. Picking up where Sellars left off, Brandom develops his own anti-foundationalist 
account of language and rationality in MIE. On Brandom's account, entitlement and commitment to beliefs 
derive from the normative attitudes of one's fellow reasoners, rather than some experiential given (MIE 
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167–180). Even observation reports are only allowed to have epistemic significance in virtue of the 
inferential moves that they enable for those taking the observer to be reliable (MIE 226–227). By 
explaining how such non-inferentially acquired beliefs are nevertheless mediated by our subjective 
practice of inference, Brandom offers a model of judgement that does not invite its separation into 
independent objective and subjective parts.
Furthermore, Brandom's commitment to pragmatism provides a promising route to make good 
Hegel's aspiration to view epistemic structures as part of the world, rather than the work of a remote 
transcendental subject. Brandom commits to understanding traditional epistemic notions – knowledge, 
belief, taking-true and making-true – in terms of normatively laden actions, things that we do in our 
environment (MIE 141–167). He thereby steers clear of what Hegel thought to be Kant's fatal first move, 
ruling out the possibility of knowledge from the outset by assuming the subject to be separate from its 
world. 
These features of Brandom's philosophical approach both suggest that Brandom is in a good 
position to appropriate Hegel's objective idealism. However, difficulties in the execution of his 
reconstruction will reveal another side to Brandom's philosophy, one which cannot be straightforwardly 
synthesised with an Hegelian outlook.
3.2 Objective idealism as a sense dependence claim
Brandom motivates his discussion of Hegel's objective idealism by asking what it is for contents 
to be determinate (HIHP 179–182). The answer he finds in Hegel is that to be determinate is to exclude 
other contents of the same kind (HIHP 179). To say that the property “transparent” is determinate is to say 
that it is impossible for an object which is transparent to at the same time be opaque. Similarly, for a state 
of affairs to be determinate is for it to rule out other possible states of affairs. “Something is happening” is 
highly indeterminate, because it places little, if any, restriction on what is the case. “Goethe died on a 
Thursday”, on the other hand, is determinate because it rules out his having died on any other day of the 
week. The idea, generally, is that to be a particular way is to be this way, rather than that. Brandom 
expresses this in the motto that “the essence of determinateness is modally robust exclusion”, which he 
takes to be a contemporary expression of the principle Hegel adopts from the medievals, omnis 
determinatio est negatio (HIHP 179).17
This criterion of determinateness applies not only to the contents of properties and states of 
affairs, but also to their subjective correlates, viz. predicates and assertions (HIHP 182). The assertion 
17 “Every determination is a negation”
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“Christmas this year falls on a weekday” is determinate because it excludes any assertions entailed by 
“Christmas this year falls on a weekend”. What is ruled out by an assertion, however, is not the possibility 
that the contrary holds (since the subject asserting it might be mistaken), nor the possibility of asserting 
something to the contrary (since the subject might, despite her best efforts, contradict herself). Rather, it is 
the propriety of materially incompatible assertions that is excluded. It is impermissible for a speaker to 
claim both that Christmas falls on the weekend and on a weekday, in parallel to the way that an object 
cannot at once be transparent and opaque. Viewed in this way, a structural similarity shows up between the 
alethic modal incompatibilities that structure the objective world, and the deontic normative 
incompatibilities that exist in virtue of the norms that govern assertions within a discursive practice. Both 
are, broadly, relations of material incompatibility (HIHP 182). This is what Brandom takes Hegel to mean 
by the claim that not only our practice, but the world as it is anyway, is “conceptual [begrifflich]” (HIHP 
181).
This is not to assert, however, that one and the same incompatibility relation structures the world 
and our discursive talk about the world. Only in the ideal case, one probably never attained, do the norms 
that govern material inferences exactly capture the modal facts. The question therefore arises how we are 
to understand the relationship between these two connected but numerically distinct incompatibility 
relations, responsible respectively for the determinateness of linguistic entities and extra-linguistic reality.
A realist might seek to explain subjective relations of deontic normative incompatibility 
(henceforth incompatibilitysub) in terms of alethic modal incompatibilities (henceforth incompatibilityobj) 
by some form of correspondence.18 On the other hand, an idealist might be expected to pursue the other 
direction of explanation, attempting to explain alethic in terms of deontic modalities.19 The claim that 
Brandom attributes to Hegel, however, is that neither the subjective nor the objective incompatibility 
relation should be considered explanatorily prior. Rather, Brandom has Hegel insist that each of these 
relations can be understood only by way of the other other. Although distinct, the two incompatibility 
relations are nonetheless “two sides of the same coin” (HIHP 182), both ways of talking about an 
underlying practice that involves both agents and objects. Brandom claims this is the basic idea behind 
Hegel's OI (HIHP 182).
Brandom suggests we think of the relationship between incompatibilitysub and incompatibilityobj 
on the model of process and relations of inference, a distinction he attributes to Harman (1984). Like 
18 Though never expressed in these terms, something like this seems to result from theories of formal semantics that are 
extended to natural languages, e.g. Lepore & Fodor (2010).
19 This latter strategy is manifested in recent neo-Sellarsian expressivist attempts to account for modal discourse in terms of 
inference licenses, for example Thomasson (2011). Brandom rebukes such attempts in MEMRTA.
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Harman, Brandom rejects the existence of rules or relations which determine the process of reasoning 
(HIHP 191–192).20 In Brandom's view, modus ponens should not be thought of as a rule that tells to infer 
q whenever we know p and if p, then q, since we might have much better evidence for ¬q and opt instead 
to reject p or if p, then q. All modus ponens really tells us is that we may not hold p, ¬q and if p, then q 
simultaneously (HIHP 192). Logical rules in general explicate the content of the responsibility we have in 
virtue of being discursive agents to be consistent, by codifying illicit combinations of commitments (MIE 
125; RP 35–47). In this way, inferential relations constrain but do not determine inferential processes. We 
can therefore distinguish between the rules which constrain inference and the process of inference that 
operates according to these constraints.21 Nonetheless, Brandom claims, this process is only intelligible as 
a process of inference in so far as it is governed by these norms. At the same time those norms cannot be 
understood in any way other than as “constraints on the inferential process of rationally altering one's 
beliefs” (HIHP 194). To fully understand either, we need to think of them both as inseparable aspects of a 
single, underlying discursive practice. Brandom does not make clear in HIHP precisely how this 
interdependence of rules and processes maps onto an interdependency of the two incompatibility relations, 
but a more perspicuous argument for this is given in BSD.
There Brandom starts from the pragmatist premise that intentionality is fundamentally a form of 
skilful engagement with objects in the world – chopping a log or catching a fish (BSD 178). More 
complex forms of intentionality like judging, believing and representing are to be explained as elaborate 
forms of this basic kind of involvement with objects rather than in terms of sui generis word-world 
relations. Such relations are an emergent, rather than determining feature of discursive practice. Since 
even the most basic intentional practices cannot be described without at least implicit reference to the 
objects they involve, it follows that it is an illusion to think we can independently describe the subjective 
incompatibilities between claimables and then combine this with an account of the objective 
incompatibilities between contents (BSD 179).22 
More specifically, Brandom argues that just by observing norms of material incompatibility we 
20 Brandom's invocation of Harman here is questionable. Brandom takes Harman's point to be that deductive logic tells us only 
what not to do inferentially, rather than what to do, for instance “not to believe all of p, if p then q, and ~q”, but early in the 
paper Brandom cites, Harman (1984, p.108) explicitly repudiates the idea that “logical principles correspond to principles of 
reasoning saying what one should not believe”. Harman (1984, p.108) not only rejects the idea that logic provides us with 
positive rules of inference, but also that it expresses open-ended “principles of belief revision” of the kind Brandom puts 
forward.
21 Wittgenstein (1967, p.440, §78) makes a general point along these when he compares rules of language to traffic rules, 
which allow and disallow certain behaviours but do not determine the pedestrian's every movement.
22 Completing this argument requires showing that an adequate account of complex intentional states can be given in terms of 
more basic forms of practical intentionality. Brandom attempts this undertaking in BSD, but Rödl (2007) doubts his success. 
The argument I present below aims to demonstrate shortcomings of Brandom's objective idealism, even under the 
assumption that his reduction of complex intentionality to basic practical intentionality goes through.
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are already implicitly talking about objects. Brandom relies on the idea that an object just is whatever 
cannot display materially incompatible properties:
The judgment that A is a dog is not incompatible with the judgment that B is a fox. The judgment 
that A is a dog is incompatible with the judgment that A is a fox. That means that taking a dog-
judgment to be materially incompatible with a fox-judgment is taking them to refer or represent an 
object: the same object. (RP 43)
Referring to objects is therefore something that we (impliclty) do whenever we engage in the 
practice of respecting norms of inference, not something that we might do as well as or instead of  
engaging in that practice. It follows, according to Brandom, that the apparent independent intelligibility of 
incompatibilitysub and incompatibilityobj is illusory. The two relations are different ways of explicating the 
same “intentional nexus” (RP 49) – the way that we are rationally in touch with each other and our world. 
Brandom characterises this as a claim of mutual dependence between the senses of the deontic normative 
and objective modal material incompatibility relations (HIHP 196). Equivalently, he asserts, we can view 
it as a claim of dependence between what is required to grasp the concepts “objective world” and 
“subjective experience”:
One can understand the concept of a determinate objective world only to the extent to which one 
understands subjective process [sic] of acknowledging error – what Hegel calls “experience” – 
which is treating two commitments one finds oneself with as incompatible (HIHP 196).
Brandom takes great pains to emphasise that this is only a claim about what is required to grasp 
the respective relations, and does not entail a corresponding causal or existential dependence of the 
objective world on subjective minds (HIHP 198–199). To establish this, Brandom argues that in general a 
dependence of the sense of one expression P on another expression Q does not entail a corresponding 
dependence of the reference of P on the reference of Q (HIHP 195–196). Even though a hammer might 
well be defined as a tool to drive nails, and a nail just as what is driven by a hammer, it does not follow 
that hammers would pop out of existence if all the nails in the world were systematically destroyed (HIHP 
195). To make the point clearer, Brandom invokes a possible-worlds framework. To see that sense 
dependence does not entail reference dependence, we need simply to observe that there could be a 
possible word at which P is instantiated (“there are hammers”) but not Q (“there are no nails”) even if the 
intension of P (“tool used for driving nails”) is a function of the intension of Q. In a phrase: “Definitional 
dependence of intensions does not entail de facto dependence of extensions” (HIHP 196). Brandom's OI, 
then, is a claim about the reciprocal sense dependence of incompatibilityobj and incompatibilitysub, which 
according to him does not entail that there would be no objective relations of modal incompatibility (and 
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therefore a determinate world) without subjective relations of normative incompatibility (i.e., the process 
of seeking to rectify incompatible commitments).
In a penetrating review of TMD, Robert Pippin (2007) observes that Brandom interprets Hegel's 
objective idealism as a variation on Kant's transcendental idealism. Kant has his own ‘reciprocal sense 
dependence thesis’, which holds “that the object is just ‘that in the concept of which the manifold is 
united’” (Pippin 2007, p.156). This view agrees with the description of Kant's conception of the object 
offered in the previous chapter: Kant, replacing the notion of object by object-for-us, makes the concept of 
object dependent on the subjective process of cognition.
Pippin observes, however, that Kant's thesis becomes a substantive philosophical commitment 
only in the context of certain metaphysical commitments that Brandom does not ascribe to. Brandom's 
position is, according to Pippin, ambiguous and threatens to be trivial:
That sort of observation [the reciprocal sense dependence of incompatibilitysub and 
incompatibilityobj] only gets its bite in positions like psychologism, or the positivist notion of 
verificationism, or in Kant’s transcendental ‘necessary conditions for the possibility of experience’ 
project, with its accompanying need for a deduction, or Wittgenstein’s Tractatus idealism in which 
the limits of language are the limits of the world, and I do not yet see where Brandom thinks his 
version gets its bite, is more than anodyne. (Pippin 2007, pp.156–157)
Pippin's comments are brief and remain unelaborated. In his reply, Brandom (2005, p.430) 
expresses puzzlement at Pippin's objection, emphasising that it is not trivial that objective relations of 
material incompatibility, defined in a “resolutely non-psychological” fashion, should nonetheless have an 
implicit conceptual connection to our practices such that the respective relations are only intelligible in 
terms of each other. This has, he remarks elsewhere, “not always been thought to be a truism (or even just 
to be true)” (BSD 189). In what follows, I will substantiate Pippin's comments by showing the sense in 
which Brandom's OI remains ambiguous, raises metaphysical questions, and, while not trivial, probably 
amounts to less than he suggests. To begin, it's useful to identify some counterveiling commitments which 
drive Brandom's reading.
3.3 Sense, reference and the spectre of British Idealism
For Brandom, a great deal evidently hangs on ensuring that objective idealism does not collapse 
into a reference dependence claim. We can identify two forces driving Brandom's desire to avoid such a 
position: Firstly, to resist aspects of Rorty's view he finds problematic, and secondly, to ensure sufficient 
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distance between his Hegel and more familiar “shadow” figure of Russell's creation.
Brandom (2000) follows his teacher Rorty (1980; 1989) in emphasising that we, rather than the 
world, are the producers and consumers of norms. In particular, both thinkers agree that linguistic norms 
including those of truth are instituted by our social practices (Rorty 1989, p.5; MIE 17). However, while 
Rorty (2000, p.184) gladly concludes from this that there were no truths before there were creatures like 
us, Brandom (2000, pp.162–165) resists this conclusion. He thinks it flies in the face of science, which 
tells us that the fact “photons exist” was true well before animals, let alone claim-making mammals, 
appeared on the scene (Brandom 2000, p.162). The advent of vocabularies did not bring about the 
existence of the things vocabularies are used to talk about. We only fall into the trap of thinking this, 
Brandom (2000, p.162) argues, when we lose track of the vital distinction between claimings and 
claimeds. There were no acts of truly claimings before there were us, and hence no truth-taking, but there 
were already true claimables. If Brandom were to endorse reference OI, he would be admitting that there 
were no objectively determinate facts until there were discursive practices, and hence conceding Rorty's 
point. A weaker form of OI is required to respect his distinctive position.
Another position Brandom no doubt hopes to steer clear of is an all too familiar one. When 
Moore (1993, p.118) declared that “there is no good reason to suppose either (A) that every physical fact is 
logically dependent upon some mental fact or (B) that every physical fact is causally dependent upon 
some mental fact” he was decrying the principle esse est percipi, which Hegel was (fairly or not) taken to 
be a representative of. If “social practice” is substituted for “mental fact” then Moore's comment becomes 
a denouncement of reference OI. To paint Hegel as a reference objective idealist, therefore, would be to 
endorse a position uncomfortably close to Russell and Moore's straw-mannish variation on the Hegel of 
the British Idealists. Writing for an audience of predominantly analytic philosophers, it's natural that 
Brandom should seek to emphasise the difference between his view and the speculative bogeyman that the 
name “Hegel” conjured in Anglophone philosophy for most of the twentieth century. Making objective 
idealism merely about what is required to grasp the two relations safeguards it against any such 
resemblance by accentuating the semantic-epistemic rather than metaphysical content of the claim.
Brandom's argument that his sense dependence thesis does not entail a corresponding reference 
dependence, however, makes use of a possible-worlds framework, which should surprise us. After all, 
possible worlds are the usual handmaidens of the “representation-first” semantics that Brandom (1997, 
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p.190) eschews.23 It would seem only charitable to take Brandom's mention of possible worlds to be 
philosophically non-commital, a mere tool of exposition. “Possible world” could be read as shorthand for, 
say, “maximally explicit consistent collection of claims.” However, if possible worlds are deflated in this 
way, then Brandom's argument ceases to be convincing. For if there are no normative incompatibilities 
(i.e., incompatibilitysub is not instantiated) then presumably there will be no claims either, since claims on 
his account are individuated by the normative incompatibilities they stand in to one another (HIHP 179). 
So there will, a fortiori, be no maximally explicit consistent collections of claims, and hence no possible 
worlds, and hence trivially no possible worlds at which incompatibilityobj is instantiated. Thus, on this 
deflationary reading, the sense dependence of incompatibilityobj on incompatibilitysub does entail a 
corresponding reference dependence.
Brandom might respond to this objection by pointing to the distinction between claimings and 
claimables. Possible worlds, he might argue, are sets of claimables, not sets of claimings. Only the latter 
are existentially dependent on norms, and so an absence of normative incompatibilities does not entail a 
dearth of possible worlds. However, as Rorty (2000, p.184) stresses, the existence of norm-independent 
‘claimables’ in this sense amounts to very little, like “saying that the rules of baseball were there, but 
unexpressed, before baseball was played.” If a “claimable” just means “the possibility of a claim being 
made,” then all Brandom's assertion that there could be an objectively determinate world without 
normative practices amounts to is that it would be possible for claim-makers to come into existence and 
assert the determinateness of the objective world, even if there were no claim-makers actually in 
existence. If Brandom tries to save his thesis by explaining “claimable” in a more robust way than this, as 
a kind of worldly or metaphysical item, then his commitment to a pragmatist order of explanation comes 
under threat. In what sense is semantics answering to pragmatics if his argument relies on semantic 
entities that, on the pain of reference dependence, are not to be understood as aspects of normative 
practice?
Equally unsettling is Brandom's reliance on the distinction between sense and reference to state 
his version of OI. For this is a Fregean distinction that goes hand in hand with a way of thinking about 
language that does think of subjective practices of inference and objective states of affairs as strongly 
independent. On Frege's (1997a [1918], pp.336–337) account, senses exist in a third realm, neither 
material nor mental, and fundamentally independent from the way the world is. But this is precisely the 
picture of language that Brandom seems to be trying to steer us away from. Brandom wants us to view the 
23 We should tread carefully here. Brandom is an avowed methodological pluralist, and his methodology, he explains, is 
motivated by a desire to display the viability of an alternative than any fundamental flaw he perceives in possible-worlds 
semantics (Brandom 1997, pp.189–190). Nevertheless, it is worth attending to the fact that Brandom takes recourse here to 
a non-inferentialist approach, evidently finding no more straightforward way to argue his point.
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sense, or meaning of an expression, as conferred by its place in that particular part of the world that is a 
discursive practice, not as an otherworldly entity. As discussed above, it is this commitment to semantic 
pragmatism which promised to satisfy the Hegelian desideratum that cognitive phenomena be worldly 
phenomena. It is therefore urgent that Brandom's OI be established in terms native to his own system, 
without drawing on the resources of Fregean or possible-world semantics, lest it presuppose what it is 
supposed to resist. However, when we look to the resources Brandom furnishes us with in MIE, it is not 
clear that we can so much as adequately state the thesis.
3.4 Possibility and perspective
MIE develops a semantic theory according to which conceptual content is always implicitly tied 
to a perspective. We saw in the Introduction how this arises out of Brandom's commitment to 
inferentialism. Since conceptual content is equated with inferential content (MIE 95), the content of a 
claim comes to depend on its inferential context and hence its utterer's perspective. Far from being a quirk 
that shows up only in the context of textual interpretation, this perspectivalism is a mainstay of Brandom's 
theory. It is implicit throughout MIE, but rears its head most fully in Chapter Eight, where Brandom 
reveals that the “essentially perspectival” (MIE 485) nature of conceptual content does not stifle 
communication, but rather makes intelligible the representational dimension of our discursive practice.
The key tool he employs to show this is his analysis of de dicto and de re propositional attitude 
ascriptions (MIE 530–547). A de dicto propositional attitude ascription is a statement of the form “S 
claims that p”, while a de re ascription has the form “S believes of t that p(it)”.24 Whereas de dicto 
ascriptions specify the content of a propositional attitude only from a given perspective, the latter, 
Brandom claims, allow the “objective” content of commitments to be made explicit by incorporating the 
commitments of a second speaker (MIE 598). This shows up as a difference in the inferential behaviour of 
the respective locutions. If I am committed to “S claims that p(t)” and “S claims that t=s”, then I may 
infer “S claims that p(s)”. On the other hand, if I am committed to “S claims that p(t)” and “t=r”, then I 
may infer that “S claims of r that p(it)”, regardless of whether S also believes that t=r (MIE 504–508). In 
this way, I can use a de re ascription to make explicit what, from my perspective, really follows from S's 
claim (MIE 598). 
An example will illustrate. If Jane believes “soy is healthy”, whereas I think “soy is a 
carcinogen”, then I may consistently infer that “Jane claims of a carcinogen that it is healthy”, even if Jane 
would deny that soy is carcinogenic. This statement makes explicit what follows from Jane's belief about 
24 Note a slight quirk in Brandom's terminology. In his regimentation, “S claims that p” just expresses S's deontic attitude, and 
does not require S to have explicitly declared that p. This is required for characteristic inferences stated below to be valid.
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the health of soy against the background of my belief that soy is a carcinogen, and thus allows a 
distinction to be made explicit, from my standpoint, between what is really the case and what Jane merely 
takes to be the case. By combining our commitments into a single de re attitude ascription, I can make it 
explicit that we are speaking about the very same object, not just using the name “soy” in two different 
ways.
Brandom celebrates the fact that this account does not require the assumption of any privileged 
standpoint associated with what is objectively true (MIE 594–595). Rather, objectivity shows up as a 
“feature the structure of discursive intersubjectivity” (MIE 599). By tracking the consequences of other 
speakers' commitments both from the perspective of their inferential background, and from one's own, 
each discursive practitioner can maintain a distinction between deontic attitude and deontic status, 
between what really is the case and what another merely takes to be the case, without the need for a 
“bird's-eye view above the fray of competing claims” (MIE 601).
Leaving aside for now the question of whether this outcome is itself desirable, I want to examine 
this doctrine's consequences for Brandom's objective idealism. It is easy to see why this might pose a 
problem for the view Brandom wishes to adopt from Hegel. Brandom's objective idealism is a statement 
about the semantic relationship between objective modal fact and subjective discursive practice. But if no 
neutral, objective perspective is available, then from whose perspective is the objective idealism thesis 
supposed to hold? More precisely: If not only normative relations of deontic incompatibility but also 
modal relations of alethic incompatibility carry with them an implicit relativisation to an inferential 
background, then an explicit statement of OI requires the specification of the inferential background 
according to which those material incompatibility relations hold. I'll use the abbreviation 
X-incompatibility to mean material incompatibility according to the inferential commitments of X. Using 
this shorthand, we can explore some candidates for resolving the ambiguity of OI.
3.4.1 Three interpretations of objective idealism
First, we might suppose that Brandom's objective idealism involves a non-perspectival 
incompatibility relation, the considerations above notwithstanding. This would give OI an awkward 
standing in Brandom's system. It would then be a thesis whose content was unspecifiable on the model of 
conceptual content that Brandom recommends. We might nonetheless adopt this interpretation and 
understand it to constitute a recantation on Brandom's behalf of his perspectivalism, but this would be a 
last resort. Apart from the fact that Brandom nowhere explicitly retracts his previous view, this 
interpretation undercuts one of his most characteristic and thoroughly elaborated ideas, and is therefore to 
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be avoided if possible.
In order to retain Brandom's commitment to the perspectivity of conceptual content, we might 
interpret Brandom to be supporting the following thesis, which I'll call de dicto OI: 
For any discursive practitioner X, there is a reciprocal sense dependence between 
X-incompatibilitysub and X-incompatibilityobj. 
In plain English, this is the claim that we cannot understand what a given subject takes to be 
impossible without understanding which norms of incompatibility that subject takes herself to be bound 
to. I call this formulation de dicto because it restricts itself to the perspective of X as regards both 
incompatibility relations, just like a de dicto propositional attitude ascription explicates commitments 
subjectively, from the perspective of a single agent. De dicto OI is the most obvious consequence of 
Brandom's arguments, and seems at times to be all he intends to establish. For instance, Brandom closes 
BSD with the suggestion that like he, Hegel was out to argue that “the activity of taking or treating two 
commitments to be incompatible in the subjective normative sense just is what it is to take or treat two 
properties or states of affairs as incompatible in the objective modal sense” (BSD 200, my emphasis).
However, if de dicto OI is the correct way to interpret Brandom's idealism, then Brandom is not 
entitled to draw from it the strong consequences that he does, and presents it in a way that is patently 
misleading. For Brandom claims, provocatively, that his objective idealism underwrites a modal realism 
(HIHP 181). Indeed, on his reading one of Hegel's great services was to show that objective idealism is the 
only way to earn the right to claims that there are true, objective, modal facts (MEMRTA 32). Taking 
assertions to be incompatible is what we are doing when we are saying that there are modal facts, and thus 
objective idealism, by stating that the concept of objective modal incompatibility implicitly involves 
subjective practices, points to the pragmatic foundations of modal fact-stating vocabularies. Yet we are 
hardly entitled to see objective idealism as giving expression to a modal realism if all that has been shown 
is a dependence between what is taken to be objective modal fact and the process of taking commitments 
to be incompatible. For objective idealism to explain modal realism, we should need a sense dependence 
between what is taken to be incompatible and what is really objective modal fact.
An interpretation of objective idealism that would come closer to vindicating Brandom's talk of a 
“modal realism” while also respecting the perspectivalism of the relations involved is the following, 
which I'll call de re OI.
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Let X and Y be any two arbitrary discursive practitioners such that Y interprets X. Then there is a 
reciprocal sense dependence between X-incompatibilitysub and Y-incompatibilityobj. 
That is, we cannot make sense of what X takes to be the case without making reference to what, from the 
perspective of Y, really is the case, and vice versa.
De re OI would be more satisfying than its de dicto counterpart if it could be established. This 
version picks up on Brandom's idea that objectivity should be understood as a difference in perspective 
that each discursive practitioner can maintain, rather than as a particular privileged standpoint. It adds to 
this idea the claim that there is a reciprocal sense-dependence between the relations which determine what 
really is the case and what any other discursive practitioner25 merely takes to be the case. In particular, if 
we let the discursive practice that we, the inquirers, engage in be Y, and let X be a real or theoretical 
discursive practice that we are theorising about (for instance, any of the autonomous discursive practices 
identified in Making It Explicit), then de re OI states that we can only make sense of the subjective norms 
of material incompatibility that practitioners of X institute by making reference to what we take to be in  
fact materially incompatible in the objective modal sense, and vice versa. This at least has the right shape 
to express the idea that an account in terms of practices of inference is required to “make intelligible” 
what we are saying when we use alethic modal vocabulary.
However, Brandom’s arguments for de dicto OI do not, in any obvious way, establish this result.26 
A dependence between what any single agent takes to be impossible and what that same agent takes to be 
impermissible does not imply a dependence between what an agent takes to be the case and what really is 
the case. Furthermore, it is still not clear that de re OI is strong enough to underwrite modal realism. We 
still have, merely, a relationship between what one agent takes to be impermissible and what another agent 
takes to be impossible. Even if one takes oneself to be the agent Y, it is difficult to avoid the impression 
that one is merely stating a relation between what are ultimately just two more perspectives (one of which 
happens to be one's own), rather than objectivity and subjectivity as such. And so long as Brandom 
requires that conceptual content be irreducibly perspectival, it's hard to imagine how one could shake this 
impression.
3.5 Conclusion
The arguments given in this section does not purport to be decisive. The non-perspectival, de dicto  
25 Or the same one again; there is no restriction that X≠Y. If we set X=Y we get de dicto OI as a special case of de re OI.
26 The best hope for establishing de re OI might be a Davidsonian argument showing that we need to make use of our own 
knowledge of modal fact in order to radically interpret anyone, however I will not explore this possibility here. I am grateful 
to Greg Strom for this thought.
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and de re interpretations do not logically exhaust all possible ways to frame Brandom's OI. Nonetheless, 
what has been shown is substantial. Recognising the requirement that material incompatibility (subjective 
or objective) needs to be specified from an inferential perspective on the deontic scorekeeping account 
shows that if Brandom is not to re-instate the Fregean distinction between a linguistic realm of senses and 
a realm of worldly practice, then serious issues arise for the interpretation of the thesis.
We can now hang some flesh on Pippin's insightful but terse remark that Brandom's OI has no 
“bite”. Brandom's arguments only establish a weak form of OI that states, for a given practice, there is a 
sense dependence between what those practitioners take to be objective modal fact and which inferences 
they disalllow. However, Brandom's presentation suggests something stronger, namely that there is a 
reciprocal sense dependence between what really is the case and what some discursive practice takes to be 
the case.
In our attempt to explicitate Brandom's OI thesis, we have observed how Brandom's 
perspectivalism and his objective idealism pull in opposite directions. Brandom begins with an idea that is 
true to Hegel as I have presented him: That the determinateness of objective reality and the process of our 
coming to know it are inextricably linked. However, in ensuring that this thesis does not entail 
metaphysical extravagances, Brandom complicates its interpretation and threatens to reduce it to a claim 
too weak to underwrite anything like modal realism. In the next and final section, I will look for the 
source of this tension, and show how it can be usefully viewed as a latent hostility between Hegelian and 
Kantian elements in Brandom's thinking. 
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4 The Fregean path to Brandom's Kantianism
In this chapter, I will show how Brandom's commitment to a Fregean account of singular terms 
and their referents leads him to adopt an essentially Kantian conception of the object. By examining how 
Frege's platonic realism was complicated by his contextualism, I will show how Brandom inherits an 
ontology from Frege that undercuts the integrity of his objective idealism. Seeing how Brandom reduces 
the object to a structural feature of discursive practice will position us to diagnose the source of the 
problems his Hegelianism encounters.
4.1 Frege: Reference and the context principle
With characteristic precision and astuteness, Dummett (1991, pp.83–86; 1973, pp.498–501) has 
argued that the early Frege's works offer two different characterisations of reference, which are not 
obviously compatible, and bear differently on Frege's ontology. On the one hand, the key to Frege's novel 
semantic approach is to think of the reference of a subsentential expression as its semantic value, that is, 
as the contribution it makes to the truth value of a sentence in which it occurs (Dummett 1991, pp.84–85). 
Simultaneously, Dummett (1973, p.499) explains, a requirement of Frege's realism is that the reference 
relation should be characterisable, in the case of singular terms, as the relation of a name to its bearer. That 
is, the reference of the term “Napoleon” should be the French general, that of “Paris”, the city itself.
In the case of concrete objects, these characterisations stand in no obvious tension. The sentence 
“Paris is the capital of France” is true just because Paris is the capital of France, that is, because “Paris” 
refers to Paris which satisfies the predicate referred to by “is the capital of France”. By referring to its 
bearer, the term “Paris” makes the appropriate contribution to the truth value of the sentence, and so the 
two characterisations of the reference of “Paris” stand in harmony. 
In the case of abstract objects, however, things are not so clear. For there is no obvious section of 
space-time that stands to the concept “justice”, the imaginary number “2+i” or “the mood of the party” in 
the relation that “Paris” does to the city of the same name. Thus, we might doubt whether the 
characterisation of reference as the relation of name to bearer holds in these cases. One way of dealing 
with this problem is to adopt an extreme platonism, stipulating a non spatio-temporal bearer for the name 
of even the most abstract objects, so as to force the two characterisations to coincide. Frege's realism 
about numbers appears, on first glance, to be an attempt to do precisely this. However, such an 
interpretation is confounded by another of Frege's commitments, the context principle:
The meaning [Bedeutung] of a word must be asked for in the context of a proposition, not in 
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isolation. (Frege 1997a, p.90)
Requiring only that a name have sense relative to any given context, rather than a uniform 
meaning across all contexts, allows for a different way of settling the reference of singular terms than by 
the name-bearer relation (Beaney 1997, pp.17–20). For supposing further that we have some way of 
settling the truth conditions of a sentence in which a name occurs other than by a prior notion of reference, 
we needn't stipulate a bearer for each name in order to define its reference. Instead, we can take the truth 
condition of the sentence in which the name occurs to have explanatory primacy, and give a purely formal 
account of reference in terms of this truth condition. Frege noticed that proceeding this way was possible 
in many mathematical cases. For instance, sentences of the form “the direction of line x = the direction of 
line y” are true just when “line x is parallel to line y”. This allows us to settle the truth-value of these 
sentences without requiring a bearer for the name “direction of line x”, assuming we already have an 
account of when “line x is parallel to line y” is true. Therefore, we can define the reference of “direction of 
line x” in a given sentence in a purely formal fashion, as its semantic value, that is, the contribution to the 
truth value of the sentence, seeing that we have an independent handle on when the sentence is true.
Dummett (1973, pp.499–500) argues that if Frege's context principle is employed in this way, 
then a severe disanalogy appears between the reference of concrete and abstract objects. Only the former 
are taken at “face-value” (Dummett 1991, p.83) to be the bearers of names, the latter have their reference 
determined formally and thus can be viewed as eliminable parts of the language. This amounts to making 
reference otiose in the case of abstract objects, since no appeal to it is required in laying down the truth 
conditions of such sentences.
In light of such considerations, Reck (2005) explores the consequences of the context principle 
for Frege's ontology. Reck argues that heeding context principle requires us not to read Frege as a platonist 
in the usual sense, as one who begins by positing a realm of objective particulars, thus treating existence 
and objecthood as primitive, then explains meaning as a relation of reference to these objects, and the 
objectivity of our judgements as deriving from this reference relation. Rather, Frege's platonism should be 
understood to invert this order of explanation (Reck 2005, p.27). The contextual platonist begins with a 
collection of basic laws which govern the objects to which our expressions refer. True statements are then 
explained as those that follow from these laws, and false statements as those that do not. In particular, 
these laws determine which statements of existence are true, and thus what exists. Terms that refer are 
simply those that function, logically, as singular terms (Reck 2005, pp.27–29).
For our purposes, the most important difference between these two forms of “platonism” is that the 
latter, but not the former, is language-relative. The reason is clear: The metaphysical platonist begins by 
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settling questions of ontology before considering matters of epistemic and linguistic access to them. Thus, 
for the metaphysical platonist, linguistic considerations are irrelevant to the question “what objects are 
there?”. The contextual platonist, by contrast, can only answer questions of ontology with respect to a 
given set of basic laws in a particular language, and so the ontology she arrives at will depending on the 
language under consideration.
4.2 Brandom, Frege and the order of semantic explanation
In his treatment of singular terms, Brandom resolutely pursues the order of explanation suggested 
by Frege's context principle (MIE 360–412). Brandom views Frege's adoption of the context principle as 
an expression the earlier Kantian idea that the judgement is the primary unit of semantic significance, an 
idea Brandom defends on pragmatist grounds (MIE 362–363). Sentences, the linguistic correlate of 
judgements, form a special semantic category because they are the smallest freestanding unit which can be 
used to make a move in the game of giving and asking for reasons. In Dummett's (1973, pp.83–84) 
terminology, only sentences are bearers of force. Since Brandom requires that semantics notions must be 
explained in pragmatic terms (MIE 83–84), he takes this to imply that a proper order of semantic 
explanation must begin with sentences and then proceed to explain the semantic role of subsentential 
components such as singular terms indirectly, in terms of the inferential properties of sentences in which 
they occur (MIE 413). This, Brandom contends, was the laudable impetus behind Frege's context 
principle, which likewise made whole sentences rather than singular terms primary in the order of 
semantic explanation (MIE 363).
Brandom embraces the conclusion that adopting this contexual approach makes reference 
unavailable as an explanatory principle. Instead, Brandom takes up the challenge to answer the question 
“what is a singular term” without recourse to “the dark and pregnant notion of referential purport” (MIE 
361). This is not to deny that language has a referential dimension. We still need to explain why it makes 
sense to think of singular terms as the names of bearers. But rather than using the concept of the name-
bearer relation to elucidate the contribution of singular terms to the meanings of sentences, Brandom 
offers a purely structural account of the semantic significance of singular terms in terms of their inferential 
roles, and on the basis of this attempts to make their representational aspect intelligible (MIE 367–376).
4.3 Brandom, Kant and the order of ontological explanation
Brandom does not explicitly address ontological questions in MIE. He does, however, follow the 
order of explanation that Reck associates with “contextual platonism” by taking the objects to which a 
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language refers to be determined by the singular terms in that language, rather than explaining reference 
via an antecedently intelligible name-bearer relation. Brandom accordingly takes it that to say what it is to 
refer to an object, one needs only to determine when it is permissible to introduce a singular term into the 
language (MIE 413–416).
While not presented as an ontological doctrine, this account has clear ontological ramifications 
similar to those that Reck attributes to Frege. Namely, on this account, what objects there are depend on 
which singular terms are used by a practice. Now this result on its own need not imply that objects can be 
created and destroyed by the whim of discursive practitioners. A Brandomian discursive practice, as we 
are often reminded (MIE 332, 632), is a group of agents in a concrete environment.27 As such, the need for 
the discursive practice to deal effectively with its environment might place some restriction on the singular 
terms which a discursive community will come to adopt.
However, when we look to the role that singular terms play in Brandom's account of language, it 
is difficult to see how the environment places any constraint on our use of singular terms whatsoever. 
Brandom does explain how the possibility of acquiring non-inferential commitments engenders the 
possibility of friction with the environment and thus causes a practice to come to endorse inferences that 
reflect modal facts. For example, we might exist in a community that permits speakers to classify anything 
that tastes sour as an acid, and anything that is an acid as something that turns phenolphthalein blue (BSD 
184–185). If we discover something that tastes sour but does not turn phenolphthalein blue, we will be 
forced to revise our norms of correctness and cease to endorse the inference form sour to acid, or from 
acid to turning phenylpthalein blue. In this way, practices can allow purely internal, deontic norms of 
correctness change in response to the objective lawlike facts exhibited by their environment. Notice, 
however, that this accounts only for how incompatibilities among concepts are brought into line with 
facts. No corresponding account is given of how the singular terms a community takes there to be come to 
reflect the objects in the environment.
In place of this, Brandom offers an account of how the practice of respecting norms of material 
inference is, ipso facto, referring to objects. Objects are just equivalence classes induced by symmetric 
inferences (MIE 484), and so taking two properties to be incompatible just is taking them to refer to a 
common object, as we saw above. Yet this gives us no reason to think that singular terms should converge 
on objects in the environment analogously to the way that inferential norms converge on modal facts. 
Brandom shows, merely, that there must be some object available to which properties can be predicated. 
His account places no restriction at all on which or how many objects the practice takes there to be. The 
27 See also Wanderer (2008, pp.176–177)
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ontological question of what objects there really are is cast aside in favour of the semantic question of 
what it is to “so much as seem to be about something” (RP 29). Though Brandom admits at one point that 
“referential purport is one thing, referential success is another” (MIE 433), he hears in this only a demand 
to explicate the difference between “taking it that an expression has been introduced as purporting to refer 
to a definite object and taking it that it in fact picks out [...] such an object” (MIE 433). But this, of course, 
is still to evade the question of what it is to in fact refer successfully to an object.
4.4 Some Hegelian misgivings
Brandom's subsumption of the question of referential success under the question of referential 
purport evidences a familiar shift in the concept of an object. Just as Kant appeals to the unity of the 
subject in order to account for the unity of the object, so too does Brandom secure the unity of the object 
via the cohesion of the discursive practice. For both Kant and Brandom, objects are ultimately reduced to 
structural features of the conceptual economy. Neither offer us a satisfactory account of relationship 
between the objects that the subject (Kant) or discursive community (Brandom) take there to be, and the 
objects that there really are. Brandom's argument that any sufficiently rich discursive practice is, as such, a 
representational practice this leaves us with something like the Kant's guarantee that our cognitive activity, 
as such, must refer to some “transcendental object = X” (CPR A109), a mere guarantee of something 
outside our subjectivity. Neither give us any grounds to think that the specific objects we take there to be 
reflect anything beyond the structure of our own cognition.
Yet this, we will recall, was precisely the feature of Kant's idealism that Hegel's objective 
idealism was designed to avoid. Hegel might object to Brandom that making the concept of object 
parasitic on that of singular term subjectivises the notion of object, and so fails to live up to the task of 
transforming Kant's subjective idealism into a properly objective idealism. For Hegel, the remedy was to 
put forward a new ontology that would allow the subject's spontaneity to coexist with the autonomy of 
objects, by literally granting them a life of their own. In Brandom's case, what is needed is an ontology 
that will show how the dependence of objects on our norms does not reduce them to mere shadows of our 
norms.
Brandom, however, is reticent to address issues of this sort. To him, ontology reeks too much of 
an attempt to reveal “the true or ultimate structure of reality” (Brandom 2008, p.179), which he thinks can 
only amount to the baseless privileging of one vocabulary over all others. Different vocabularies make 
different features of the world and our practices explicit, Brandom claims, but none are inherently more 
fundamental than others. This ontological egalitarianism echoes the perspectivalism which, as we saw in 
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the previous chapter, confounds his interpretation of objective idealism. Brandom shares with Kant the 
modesty to refrain from saying what the object is apart from our normative constitution of it, and to hope 
for no stronger sense of “really true” than “what, from my perspective, really is true.” Kant was content to 
be so modest, but Hegel was not. His objective idealism was designed to grant Kant's perspectivalism but 
free us from its thrall, by providing us with an ontology that would allow us to see this limitedness as 
constitutive of the things in itself, and hence indirectly allow us knowledge of it. Short of such an 
ontology, however, it is difficult to see how Brandom provides us with any more than a socially inflected 
form of Kantianism.
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5 Conclusion: Kantian modesty or Hegelian ambition?
I introduced my project by arguing that to respect Brandom's methodology, we must go further 
than merely pointing out differences between Brandom and Hegel. An effective critique of de re  
reconstructive metaphysics must show that some such differences are pernicious by Brandom's own lights. 
This is what I have attempted to show by providing a rival reconstruction of Hegel's objective idealism. So 
as to respect Brandom's decision to “pick and choose,” I have used my own reading of Hegel as a guide to 
points of tension in Brandom's own account, rather than a standard of correctness for it.
As I read him, the gravamen of Hegel's dissatisfaction with Kant was his subjectivism. Kant 
addressed the problem of the unity of the object by appealing to the free activity of the subject, but had 
thereby made the object of knowledge look like a thing of the subject's creation. I argued against Stern that 
Hegel's response to Kant is not to revert to Aristotelian ontology, but rather to reject Kant's metaphysics of 
intentionality. The subject's active role in the synthesis of the object only leads to sceptical conclusions if 
we assume that our free activity cannot also be viewed as the development of the object itself. Resisting 
Kant's subjectivism therefore turns on finding a way to view epistemic structures as objective processes. 
In this sense, rather than Stern's, Hegel addresses Kant's subjectivism at the level of ontology.
I went on to suggest that Brandom appeared to be in a good position to take on board Hegel's 
objective idealism since, thanks to Sellars, he is acutely conscious of the myth of the given. Brandom 
therefore proceeds, in Hegelian fashion, to offer an account of intentionality which allows no clean 
separation of the “subjective and objective poles of the intentional nexus” (RP 53). However, in its 
execution, Brandom's reading of Hegel faces serious problems. Brandom attempts to restrict his idealism 
to a claim about our grasp of concepts, rather than what there is. This thesis turned out to be difficult to 
square with his perspectivalism, which denies any objective standpoint from which the thesis might hold.
With Brandom's Fregean concept of the object in view, we can see more clearly where Brandom's 
Hegelianism miscarries. Brandom ensures that talk of objectivity is inseparable from talk of subjective 
practice only by making us, the discursive practitioners, wholly responsible for which objects there are. 
This shows up in his account of singular terms, which can be viewed as a social-discursive analogue of 
Kant's transcendental idealism. Hegel could object to Brandom, as he did to Kant, that by making objects 
dependent singular terms, and singular terms a reflection of the norms we create, Brandom fails to offer us 
a way to view our free activity as the realisation of the object's own nature. Instead, objective reference 
comes to look like the internal activity of a discursive practice, reminiscent of the solipsism of the 
transcendental ego that Hegel thought was the outcome of Kant's subjective idealism.
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For this reason, Brandom's pragmatism fails to live up to the promise of de-subjectivising Kant's 
idealism. Though it does indeed offer a way to view cognitive structures as worldly processes, his distaste 
for ontology prevents him from giving an account of the object which would allow the autonomy of the 
object to coexist with a community of free subjects. Instead, by employing his pragmatism to purely 
semantic ends, Brandom shirks the question of what there is outside of us, and so re-enacts Kant's tragedy 
of solitary subject at the level of the discursive community.
I do not pretend that these criticisms constitute a definitive refutation of Brandom's reading, nor 
do I think that Brandom’s attempt is without value. Brandom performs a rare feat by translating Hegel out 
of his native idiom, without any residual dependence on unexplained Hegelian jargon. Whether we 
ultimately read Hegel's objective idealism as a claim of sense-dependence, reference-dependence or in a 
way that defies these categories, Brandom deserves to be commended for offering a vocabulary in which, 
or against which, this debate can take place. The value of a vocabulary, after all, resides largely in the 
possibilities for its eventual subversion, as Rorty would no doubt agree.
What ultimately confounds Brandom's historical enterprise seems to be the range of loyalties he 
attempts to maintain. By overplaying the continuity between Kant, Hegel and Frege, Brandom turns their 
differences into problems for his own view. Though he provides a most ambitious revitalisation of these 
“mighty dead,” his work still evidences the tendency to homogenise the views of the German Idealists. 
Whereas Russell did this so as to reject them in one fell swoop, Brandom does so for the sake of their 
revival. But if Russell's Hegel was a straw-man, then Brandom's threatens to look a disfigured creation.28 
Hegel did not simply add a socio-historical dimension to Kant, and any attempt to read him as if he did 
will face grave difficulties.
When Dieter Henrich set out half a century ago to bring German idealism back into contact with 
the Anglophone world, he made no attempt to veil the fractures which permeate that tradition. The 
transatlantic collection he edited was aptly titled “Kant oder Hegel?” (Henrich 1983). There are elements 
of Brandom's philosophy that make him uniquely placed to effect a Hegelian revival in analytic 
philosophy, as he is well aware. However, this Hegelian ambition stands in tension with his Kantian 
modesty, as evidenced by the difficulties that arise when we try to interpret Brandom's “objective 
idealism” in line with his MIE account of content. Brandom needn't swallow whole either Kant's or 
Hegel's position, but he must recognise these incompatibilities, for the sake of the unity of his own system, 
and for a true analytic Hegelianism.
28 Like McDowell (2007, 1:21:30–1:21:46) thinks Brandom's “analytic pragmatism” risks looking like a “Frankenstein 
monster, […] something enabled to stumble about in a semblance of life by having had new organs grafted into it”.
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